Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. If reliable and stable, they could offer a new, cost effective, way to record transactions and asset ownership, but are they? We model the blockchain as a dynamic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners. We show that mining the longest chain rule is a Nash equilibrium, without forking on the equilibrium path, in line with the seminal vision of Nakamoto (2008). We also clarify, however, that the blockchain game is a coordination game, which opens the scope for multiple equilibria. We show there exist equilibria with forks, leading to orphaned blocks and also possibly to persistent divergence between different chains. * We thank B. Gobillard, A. Kirilenko, and the members of the TSE Blockchain working group for helpful comments. Financial support from the FBF-IDEI Chair on Investment banking and financial markets value chain is gratefully acknowledged.
Introduction
A blockchain is a distributed ledger, recording transactions and ownership, operated within a peer to peer network (See Harvey (2016) and Yermarck (2017) ). In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach to analyse the behaviour of blockchain participants. We examine if in equilibrium the blockchain technology gives rise to a stable and reliable distributed ledger.
The cryptocurrency (or virtual currency) Bitcoin operates with a blockchain, and, in that case, the ledger records ownership of bitcoins. Distributed ledgers, however, can in principle be used to record many types of transactions and asset ownership. The original design of Blockchain was first presented in Nakamoto (2008) . In Section 5 of his paper, Nakamoto (2008) describes the working of the Blockchain as follows "The steps to run the network are as follows: 1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 2. Each node collects new transactions into a block. 3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash."
The nodes conducting the above mentioned tasks are called "miners", as they "mine" to solve proof of work problems, 1 and get rewarded for this in Bitcoins. When mining, a miner sets a computer capacity that performs trials to find a hash value lower than a given threshold. Each trial is independent: past failures do not affect the probability of success of a future trial. Once a trial is successful, the winning miner sends the block with the solution to other participants. If participants accept this block as the new consensus, they take it as the parent of the new block they start mining. In that case (unless the consensus is altered), the miner who solved the block gets a reward.
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The protocol makes it hard to solve a block so that validated blocks are almost "set in stone", thus preventing attempts to "rewrite history." It is important indeed that, once validated, the state of the ledger be difficult to modify, so that transactions and ownership recorded in the Blockchain be reliable and stable. One potential problem, identified by the designer of the Blockchain protocol, and that the difficulty of proof of work intends to solve, is that of "double spending." A simple example of attempted double spending could be described as follows: Consider two miners, A and B. Suppose A buys an object from B in exchange for some of his bitcoins. That transfer of A's bitcoins to B is recorded in block B n . Then, instead of chaining his next blocks to B n , A "forks" and mines the parent block of B n : B n−1 . If A was able to quickly mine his fork and attach many blocks to it, it could exclude B n from the consensus and thus void the transfer of bitcoins from A to B. Having recovered his bitcoins from B, A would then be able to spend them again, and would thus have "double spent." The difficulty of the cryptographic problem miners have to solve to provide a proof of work makes it unlikely that A can solve many blocks rapidly to alter the consensus. It is hoped that this will preclude double spending.
Non-instantaneous dissemination of information through the network is another potential reason why forks, i.e., competing versions of the ledger, could arise. Nakamoto (2008) identified that problem and suggested it would be solved if miners always chained their blocks to the longest chain, i.e., followed the Longest Chain Rule (hereafter LCR): different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof ofwork is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one."
In the present paper, we abstract from these two problems, assuming miners don't attempt to double spend and also that information is instantaneously disseminated in the network. In this frictionless world, it is commonly argued, in particular by members of the Fintech business community, that blockchains should give rise to a single and stable consensus, and thus offer a reliable and cost-effective way to record transactions and ownership. 4 We examine the validity of that "folk theorem".
To do so, we rely on a theoretical model, capturing the key features of the blockchain technology. We model the blockchain as a game, we analyse miners' best responses and beliefs, and we characterise the properties of the corresponding equilibria. Explicitly writing down the blockchain as a game, and explicitly writing down the action space, beliefs and strategies of the miners, is necessary to pin down precisely the economic forces at play in that environment, the tradeoffs faced by the miners, and the economic mechanisms pushing towards stability or instability of the distributed ledger.
Our analysis uncovers two important economic forces at play in the blockchain.
First, because the value of the rewards for mining a block in a given blockchain depends on the credibility of that chain and correspondingly on the number of miners active on that chain, the blockchain game is a coordination game: If I anticipate all the others to mine a given chain, this increases my incentives to mine that chain. As often in coordination games, there can be multiple equilibria and instability. We show below that there exists one equilibrium involving a single chain and in which the LCR holds (Proposition 1). We also show that this equilibrium is robust to one-shot deviations followed by reversals to the LCR (Proposition 2). On the other hand, we show that there also exist equilibria involving forks (Proposition 3). The existence of these forks creates uncertainty about the allocation of property rights and undermines the stability and reliability of the distributed ledger.
Second, we identify another force which we refer to as "vested interest": When a miner solves blocks on a chain, he is rewarded with units of the cryptocurrency associated with that chain. As long as the miner has not sold this cryptocurrency, he has a vested interest in that chain becoming the consensus. Now, miners cannot immediately sell the cryptocurrency they receive as reward for the blocks they hold. They must keep them until sufficiently many blocks have been attached to that chain (this is the so called "k-blocks rule"). This can lead miners working on different chains to continue to do so, in order to beat the competing chain. This can contribute to the emergence of persistent forks (Proposition 4).
While the persistent forks result hinges on the strategic behaviour of miners, who anticipate their strategy will affect the value of their rewards, the emergence of forks, making the previously longest chain orphan, relies only on coordination effects, and would also arise in a competitive environment.
Our focus on forks arising without manipulating behaviour, attacks or double spending differs from the bulk of the literature. For example, Bonneau, et al (2016) analyse how mining pools controlling a large fraction of the computing power could attack the chain. Eyal and Sirer (2014) show how colluding miners can obtain a revenue larger than their fair shares. Teutsch, Jain and Saxena (2016) study how a strategic miner can fork and attack the blockchain to double spend. The paper to which ours is the closest is Kroll, Davey and Felten (2013) . They note that the interaction between miners should be analysed as a game. They define strategies as a mapping from the chain structure so far into which block is selected by a miner. They consider two chains L r and L r+1 such that L r+1 is L r to which a new block is appended. They define a monotonic strategy as one in which miners choose to chain their blocks to L r+1 rather than L r . They note that the longest chain rule is a monotonic strategy. They argue intuitively that if σ is a monotonic strategy, then the game has a Nash equilibrium in which miners play σ. They conclude that the LCR is a Nash equilibrium, but that there exist other equilibria. While their analysis offers interesting economic intuition, it does not offer a formal analysis and proof of equilibrium. Another difference between our paper and theirs is our finding that forks can occur in equilibrium.
Several papers (e.g. Evans, 2014) note that an additional problem with the bitcoin mining incentive scheme is that miners are paid with Bitcoins whose value is volatile. In our analysis, the only source of variation in the value of rewards is the number of miners in a chain. We analyse how these variations affect incentives. Schijvers, Bonneau, Boneh and Roughgarden (2015) study a different type of incentive problems than that we consider. They study the behaviour of miners in a pool, assuming that the pool organiser does not observe when miners solve blocks nor the computing power they dedicate to that task. They analyse how to incentivise miners to reveal that they have solved a block as soon as they have done so.
The next section presents our model. Section III presents our results. Proofs are in appendix.
Model
Miners and pools: There are M miners indexed by m ∈ M = {1, ...M }. Miners are risk neutral, rational and infinitely patient. While, in our model, we refer to each m as a miner, in practice miners work in pools, which coordinate the efforts of their miners, in particular as regards which blocks they mine. For example, on https://www.bitcoinmining.com/bitcoin-miningpools/, one can read:
"If you participate in a Bitcoin mining pool then you will want to ensure that they are engaging in behavior that is in agreement with your philosophy towards Bitcoin...Therefore, it is your duty to make sure that any Bitcoin mining power you direct to a mining pool does not attempt to enforce network consensus rules you disagree with." Thus, we can think of M as the number of pools. Figure 1 presents the distribution of computing power of the pools operating on Bitcoin in January 2017: 14 mining pools represented 95% of the total hash capacity.
5 Thus, a reasonable order of magnitude for M is around 15. Because the number of pools is finite, it is appropriate to take a game theoretic approach, in which each of the M players behaves strategically. In the discussion below, we will highlight which results rely on this strategic behaviour and which would also obtain in a competitive environment. Mining technology: There is a continuous flow of transactions sent for confirmation by end-users.
6 For the moment, for simplicity, we assume all miners perfectly and instantaneously observe this flow. To initialize the process, there is a stock of transactions available at time 0. We define this stock as block B 1 , and assume all participants start mining it at time 0 (for simplicity we normalize the cost of mining to 0.) Block B 1 defines the starting point of the consensus in the blockchain.
The time it takes a miner to solve his block depends on the difficulty of the cryptographic problem and the miner's computing power. The difficulty is set by the Blockchain protocol so that the average duration between two blocks in the network is constant (10 minutes on Blockchain and between 10 and 20 seconds on Ethereum (ETH)). Correspondingly, as long as the total computing power in the network (summing across all branches) does not change, the difficulty of the cryptographic problem does not change. If the total computing power increases (e.g., due to the entry of new miners and new pools), the difficulty is scaled up so that average duration between two blocks remains equal to the desired level. Thus, on Bitcoin every 2,016 blocks, i.e., approximately every 2 weeks, the difficulty is rescaled to ensure that the average time between blocks remains at 10 minutes. In the present paper we consider a stationary environment, in which the number of miners and the difficulty of the task are constant.
As explained in Nakamoto (2008) , the time it takes miner m to solve a block problem is exponential with parameter θ m . For a given computational power, the greater the difficulty, the lower the intensity θ m . A key property of the exponential distribution is that it is memoryless: at each point in time, the distribution of the waiting time until the miner finds a solution independent from how long the miner has been working on the problem.
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An important feature of the blockchain is that this waiting time is also independent of which block m is mining, and also from the blocks the other miners are mining. These properties have important strategic consequences. For example, suppose m has been mining block B n , and another miner solves 6 For simplicity we take the flow of transactions to be exogenous, while in practice it can actually be endogenous. In fact, we don't model the transactions and model the blockchain process directly at the level of the blocks.
7 Another key property of the exponential distribution is that the minimum of two exponentials, with parameters θ and θ , is also exponential, with parameter θ + θ . Thus, when interpreting the M players in our game as M pools, we interpret the intensity of pool m, θ m , as the sum of the intensities of the miners active in that pool. a block (possibly B n or possibly another one). At this point, the duration until the next time at which m solves is independent of whether m continues to mine B n or any other block.
For simplicity we assume (in line with what happens in practice) that miners don't update the set of transactions defining the block they mine until they have solved the hash problem (transactions that flow in meanwhile are stored in a buffer.) Relaxing that assumption would not alter the economic mechanism we analyse below.
Blockchain and consensus:
Once the first block, B 1 , has been solved (at time t B 1 ), define B 2 as the block composed of all the transactions that occurred between time 0 and time t B 1 and are consistent with B 1 (i.e., don't involve double spending or mistakes.) B 1 is the parent of B 2 . If participants decide to mine B 2 and don't afterwards deviate to another history, then the chain {B 1 , B 2 } will become the consensus after B 2 has been successfully mined. Iterating, if all miners decide to mine block k whose parent is k − 1,
Except in the simple case above, in which there is a single chain, determining the consensus can be difficult. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: Suppose that a sequence of blocks {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n } has been solved. If all miners decide to mine B n+1 , whose parent is B n , as opposed to any block attached to a parent B n−k , we say that miners apply the longest chain rule (LCR). If, instead, some miner m chose to mine another blockB n , whose parent is not B n , but, e.g., B n−1 , this would be a deviation from the LCR. If, at the same time other participants mined B n+1 that would create a fork, with two alternative block parenthood histories competing to become the consensus.
8 Figure 2 illustrates this situation, denoting by t B k (k ∈ {1, ...n}) the time at which B k is solved.
Rewards for solving blocks: When miner m solves a block in a given chain, he receives a reward, in the cryptocurrency corresponding to that chain.
9 For example, when a miner solves a hash problem on Bitcoin or Ethereum, he is rewarded in bitcoins or ethers. This reward is included in the block he mined. The value of this reward will depend on the consensus about the chain stemming from this block. First, suppose that the block the miner solved becomes orphaned, as no miners are active on blocks chained to that block. Then the reward for this block becomes valueless. If the miner tried to use it in a transaction, the others would not include it in the block they mine.
Second turn to the case in which the block is included in a chain that competes with another one for the consensus. As long as a significant fraction of the miners are working on each of the chains, the value of rewards included in the blocks of the two chains become more uncertain, but can remain positive. For example, after the Ethereum hard fork, the currency of the majority fork ETH (which attracts a greater number of miner and larger computing power) is worth more than the currency of the minority fork ETC (on January 10, 2017, the exchange rate was .137 while the computing power of ETC was 14% of that of ETH). Figure 3 presents the evolution of the exchange rates of the two cryptocurrencies after the July, 20 Ethereum fork.
10 Figure 4 plots the difficulty of the proof of work problem on ETC and ETH which reflects the computing power on the two chains. Comparing figures 3 and 4 one can see that the exchange rate of each chain moves in par with its computing power. In line with these observations, we assume that the value of the reward obtained by miner m for mining block B n is an increasing function, G(.), of the number of miners active at time z m in the chain including B n . For example, suppose there are two active chains at time z m , involving different sequences of solved blocks: {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−k , B n−k+1 , ...B n−1 , B n } and {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−k ,B n−k+1 , ...B n }. If there are K miners active in the former chain and M − K in the latter, the rewards for solving blocks are the following: The miner who solved block B n , which we denote by m(B n ), earns reward G(K) for block B n . The miner who solved blockB n earns reward G(M − K) for that block. The miner who solved block B n−k , which beClassic. Today, two networks coexist, with Ethereum Classic representing about 14% of the hash capacity and market cap of ETH. 
We also assume that G(0) = G(1) = 0 to reflect the fact that, when there is only one or no miner on a chain, the associated currency has no exchange value. For K > 1 we make no assumption on G(.) except that it is increasing. This allows for situations in which blocks are valuable only if they belong to chains attracting almost all the miners, as well as less extreme situations.
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11 There is also the case in which z m occurs just after a fork starts, following B n . The probability of this event is very small, and in practice it is not a very relevant consideration, but, for completeness, we need to specify the value of the reward earned by m(B n ) in that case, if K miners work on B n+1 , while M − K work onB n whose parent is B n−1 . Three alternative hypotheses are possible. First, one could posit that the not yet realised fork does not reduce the credibility of the current chain. In that case, m(B n ) earns G(M ) for B n . Second, one could posit that, irrespective of how many miners fork, the attempt to fork reduces the overall credibility of the chain, reducing the reward for B n to some arbitrary g < G(M ). Third, one could posit that the reward for B n is worth G(K). We will highlight in the proofs the extent to which these alternatives affect our construction.
Strategies and payoffs:
We assume that, at time z m , exponentially distributed, with parameter λ m , miner m is hit by a liquidity shock. At this point the miner must consume real goods and, to fund this consumption, sells the cryptocurrency he earned as reward for mining blocks. We assume m sells to a new miner, who also inherits his beliefs. Thus, exits are compensated by entries, so that the environment is stationary. For simplicity, we assume that, until time z m , the miner keeps the cryptocurrency he earned. In practice, miners don't sell their reward immediately after they have earned it. The so called "k-blocks rule" implies that the cryptocurrency obtained by m for solving B n will be accepted by others only after sufficiently many blocks have been chained to B n .
Miners choose their strategies to maximize their expected reward at time z m .
12 The mining strategy of miner m, denoted by σ m , maps, at each time t, the history of the game so far (H t ), and the beliefs of miner m into the block that m chooses to mine. We study Nash equilibria of the mining game, i.e., vectors of strategies such that σ m is a best response to σ −m , ∀m.
Because of the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, the number of blocks solved by miner m at time t is independent of his strategy and of the strategies of the other miners. The number of blocks solved by miner m at time t ≤ z m ,
is Poisson distributed, with intensity θ m . Suppose miner m has been mining block B n , and another miner solves a block (possibly B n or possibly another one). At this point, the duration until the next time at which m solves his next hash problem is independent of whether m continues to mine B n (if the hash problem for that block has not been solved yet), or any other block (which might include transactions in B n or not). This plays a key role in the strategic analysis below.
Equilibrium analysis
To analyse equilibrium strategies, it is useful to first note that an upper bound on the lifetime payoff miner m can earn is
This is because i) the total number of blocks solved by m before z m is zm t=0 dN m (t), whatever his mining strategy, and ii) m cannot earn more than G(M ) each time he solves a block. At time t, the expectation of
Relying on the above observations, we state our first proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a Nash equilibrium in which, at each date, all participants choose to mine the longest chain.
To prove Proposition 1, it is sufficient to note that, if the others follow the LCR, then m can obtain G max m by also following the LCR. Indeed, if all miners, including m, follow the LCR, then, at time z m there is only one chain. Thus, each block mined by m earns G(M ). Consequently it is (at least weakly) optimal for m to follow the LCR if the others do.
In the context of the strategic interaction characterized in Proposition 1, miners are not really competing to solve their block before the others. That another miner solves his block before m does not, in itself, reduce m's gains. The only thing that matters for miners to obtain the maximum payoff they get in Proposition 1 is that they coordinate well and all work on the same chain.
Observe that the result in Proposition 1 does not depend on the number of miners M . The economic mechanism involved in Proposition 1 does not hinge on strategic behaviour. The result would also obtain in a competitive environment.
13 Because of our exponential distribution assumption E [G While Proposition 1 states that following the LCR is an equilibrium, it does not imply that this is the only equilibrium. We explore below the robustness of this equilibrium to several types of deviations. Consider the case in which a sequence of blocks {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n } has been solved. If miners were to follow the LCR, in line with Proposition 1, they would mine B n+1 whose parent is B n . To assess the robustness of the LCR equilibrium, we first analyse the viability of a candidate alternative strategy, in which miners (except maybe m(B n )) decide to mineB n whose parent is B n−1 and then revert to LCR. As stated in the following proposition, this deviation cannot arise in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There is no equilibrium such that i) all participants, except possibly the miner who solved the last block, decide to fork once from the longest chain and ii) then all stick to the chain that becomes the longest just after this fork.
To see the intuition, consider the choice faced by m = m(B n ), between mining B n+1 (on the initial chain) and miningB n (on the fork). This choice does not affect m's gains if the next event is that another miner solves his block. In that case, after the other miner solves his block, m must choose which block to mine and that choice is unaffected by which block m had just been mining. Thus, the only relevant case is that in which m solves the next block. If he sticked to the initial chain, and was mining B n+1 then the chain {B 0 , ...B n , B n+1 } is confirmed as the longest one and all other miners revert to it. In this case, m earns the maximum possible payoff. If instead, m was miningB n then there are two chains of equal length: {B 0 , ...B n } and {B 0 , ...B n }. In that case, m can obtain the same payoff as when he was mining B n+1 only if the chain includingB n becomes the consensus with probability one. However, at this point, the miner who had solved block B n still prefers to mine the initial chain, which implies that there is a strictly positive probability that {B 0 , ...B n } does not become the consensus.
So far, we focused on situations in which LCR emerged in equilibrium. Is it always the case, or are there equilibria involving deviations from LCR? We now show that LCR is not always followed in equilibrium, by exhibiting an equilibrium in which participants fork, in contradiction with the LCR. In this forking equilibrium, after B n has been mined, all the participants fork, and mineB n−f +1 whose parent is B n−f . This fork becomes the only active chain. Since it does not include blocks B n−f +1 to B n , miners do not earn any reward for these blocks.
14 Proposition 3 Suppose that, if and only if there has been no sunspot yet, each time a block is solved, with probability ε there is a sunspot. The sunspot suggests miners to mine from parent block B n−f , with 1 ≤ f < n, where B n is the most recent block in the longest chain. There exists an equilibrium in which all miners follow the LCR when there is no sunspot, while, when there is a sunspot, they fork toB n−f +1 and then follow the LCR on the chain stemming fromB n−f +1 .
The intuition of the proposition is the following: If I expect all to fork tõ B n−k+1 , I expect the rewards on the chain followingB n to be more valuable, therefore I choose to do like the others and fork toB n−k+1 . Again, Proposition 3 emphasizes that the mining game is a coordination game.
In the context of Proposition 3, the fork stemming fromB n−k+1 becomes the only active chain. Since it does not include B n , m(B n ) is not rewarded for solving block B n . Consequently, m earns less than G max m , while the other miners don't earn more than G max m . Thus the forking equilibrium in Proposition 3 is Pareto dominated by the LCR equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Similarly to Proposition 1, Proposition 3 does not depend on the number of miners M . Both propositions hinge on coordination effects, which also arise in a competitive environment.
While in the previous proposition, in spite of forking, there was eventually a single chain, we now show that forking can lead to the persistent coexistence of different branches.
As in Proposition 3, we consider the possibility that, at time t Bn there is a sunspot suggesting that some miners fork to a new chain whose parent is B n−f . This can give rise to two coexisting chains at time t > t Bn : the old chain {B 1 , ...B n−f , B n−f +1 , ..., B n−f +i } and the new chain
14 This might also eliminate some of the underlying transactions included in blocks
The number of blocks solved by m after t B n−f on any of the two chains defines the vested interest of m on that chain. We denote the vested interests of miner m on the old and new chain by v old (m, t) and v new (m, t) respectively. For example, suppose miner m keeps mining the old chain. The vested interest of that miner on the old chain is, at time t equal to v old (m, t) = N m (t) − N m (t B n−f ), while his vested interest on the new chain is v new (m, t) = 0. Alternatively, consider miner m who mines the new chain from time t Bn on. The vested interest of that miner on the old chain is, at time t equal to
For miners switching between the old and the new chain, vested interests are a bit more intricate, but follow the same logic.
In our model miners hold their rewards until z m and therefore have vested interests. In practice, miners cannot sell their rewards immediately after solving blocks, due to the k-blocks rule. Our model takes a simplified view of this situation by assuming that the vesting period lasts until z m . Our next result illustrates the consequences of vested interests. 
and for m > K
then there exists a sunspot equilibrium in which miners m ≤ K fork at time t t Bn to the chain whose parent is B n−f (and hereafter remain on that chain), while miners m > K forever remain on the original chain.
The intuition of this result is the following. First note that for some miners to fork, we must have that the right-hand-side of (3) be non negative, which implies that K ≥ M 2 +1. That is, in Proposition 4, persistent forks can occur only if a majority of miners choose to fork and this is expected by all. Now, suppose all miners expect that a majority will fork and this will result in two coexisting chains and consider the choice of miner m between forking and remaining on the old chain. For m, the benefit from forking is that the blocks mined on the forking chain will be more valuable than those mined on the old fork, since K > M 2 . This benefit is large if the miner expects to solve many blocks before time z m , i.e., if θm λm is large. On the other hand, the cost of mining the new chain is that it reduces the value of the blocks already mined on the old chain. This cost is large relative to the benefit if v old (m, t Bn ) is large and if θm λm is low. Indeed, in equilibrium the lifetime expected gains of the miners who fork, computed at time t Bn is
while the lifetime expected gain of miners who remain on the old chain is
Comparing (4) and (5) highlights the role played by vested interests, v old (m, t Bn ), and θm λm in the miner's choice to fork or not, in line with conditions (3) and (2) in Proposition 4. Finally note that condition (1) ensures that the set of miners who choose to stick to the old chain has no intersection with the set of miners who prefer to fork. Figure 5 represents the competing chains sustained at the equilibrium of Proposition 4.
Unlike Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, the conditions in Proposition 4 depend on the number of miners. More precisely, the tradeoffs faced by the miners involve the effect of their mining strategy on the value of their rewards. If miners were competitive and their choice had no impact on the value of their rewards, this strategic effect would not arise.
To illustrate Proposition 4, consider the case in which M = 15, which, as mentioned in the previous section is a reasonable order of magnitude, and
Old chain with M − K miners
New chain with K miners is constant across miners and G is linear. Then, Proposition 4 implies that the condition under which K = 12 miners would prefer to fork, while the M − K = 3 others would prefer to stick to the old chains is that the vested interest of the latter would be above
while those of the latter would be below
i.e., that the miner with the third largest vested interest would have solved a bit more than 50% more blocks than the next miner. Finally note that the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 4 is Pareto dominated by that in Proposition 1. Again, forking reduces the total gains of the miners, and yet it can arise in equilibrium.
• If m solved B n+1 , then {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n , B n+1 } becomes the longest chain. At this point all miners follow the LCR, and the only active chain at time z is that including {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n , B n+1 }. In that case, the expected gain of m is equal to the sum of his previous gains, his gain from solving B n+1 , and his expected gains after t * :
• If m solvedB n at t * , then there are now two competing chains of the same length {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n } and {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 ,B n }. At this point it is useful to distinguish the following three events which can occur after t * :
-If z m occurs before any block is solved, irrespective of which block m decides to mine after t * , m cannot earn more than (N m (t Bn ) + 1)G(M ), which (from (6)) is what m earns when he solves B n+1 at t * and z occurs just after.
-If B n+1 is solved beforeB n+1 , and before z m occurs, then all miners revert {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n , B n+1 } and an upper bound for m's expected gains is
This upper bound can be attained by following the LCR after t B n+1 , in which case m loses the reward from miningB n since it becomes an orphaned block. Suppose instead that m sticked to the chain stemming fromB n . He would be the only one to do so. Hence his rewards from this fork would be worthless, since we assume G(1) = 0.
-IfB n+1 is solved before B n+1 and before z occurs, then all miners hereafter stick to {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 ,B n ,B n+1 } and an upper bound for m's expected gains is (6) which can be attained if m follows the LCR. Now compare the expected gains of m after solving B n+1 and after solving B n : In all states of the world, m's expected gains are at least as large after solving B n+1 than after solvingB n . Furthermore, if there is a strictly positive probability that B n+1 is solved beforeB n+1 after m solvedB n , then his expected gains are strictly larger when he mines B n+1 at t Bn than when he minesB n at t Bn . We now show that this probability is strictly positive. B) To do so, we analyse the strategy of m(B n ) at t * whenB n has just been solved by m = m(B n ). We show that in that case m(B n ) still prefers to continue mining B n+1 . This implies that the probability that B n+1 is solved beforeB n+1 (after m = m(B n ) solvedB n ) is strictly positive. Again there are three possible events after t * :
• i) z m occurs before any additional block is solved,
• ii) one of m(B n )'s competitors solves his block first
• iii) m(B n ) solves his block before the others.
i) If z m occurs first. If m(B n ) was mining B n+1 his expected gain is
where K is the number of other miners active on the chain including B n (there are M − K − 1 other miners active on the chain includingB n ), and G(K + 1) is the gain earned by m(B n ) on block B n . If m(B n ) was mining B n+1 his expected gain is
where G(K) is the gain earned by m(B n ) on block B n . Since G(K + 1) ≥ G(K), if z m occurs first m(B n ) earns larger gains if he mined B n+1 than if he minedB n+1 . ii) Now suppose another miner solves his block before m(B n ) does and before z m occurs. In that case, as above, m(B n )'s continuation value is unaffected by which block he mined.
iii) Finally suppose m(B n ) solves his block before the others and before z occurs. If he was mining B n+1 then {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 , B n , B n+1 } becomes the longest chain. In that case, m(B n )'s expected gain is
where the term 2G(M ) reflects the miner's reward for block B n and for block B n+1 . If instead he was miningB n+1 then the only chain that survives is that including {B 1 , B 2 , ...B n−1 ,B n ,B n+1 }. His expected gain is only
, since m loses the reward from mining B n which becomes orphaned. Consequently, when m(B n ) solves his block before the others and before z occurs, his gain is strictly larger if he was mining B n+1 .
Consequently, afterB n has been solved, m(B n ) strictly prefers to mine B n+1 thanB n+1 . QED Proof of Proposition 3: I) First consider that a sunspot occurs just after B n is solved. Denote byB n−f +1 the new block which the sunspot suggests to mine, and whose parent is B n−f .
Consider the optimal response of miner m. To do so, compare his expected gain if he chooses to mine B n+1 to his expected gain if he minesB n−f +1 . When performing this comparison, in line with the proof of Proposition 2, we consider three cases: 1) The case in which z m occurs first. 2) The case in which m solves his block before the others and before z. 3) The case in which another miner solves his block before m and before z m . 1) First suppose z m occurs before any miner solves a block, so that there is only one chain including solved blocks. Following Footnote 11, it is straightforward to see that the gains of m are independent of which block he is mining if the value of the blocks he solved on the main chain is G(M ) or g. The third possible specification implies that m's reward for the blocks he solved between B n−f +1 and B n is 0 irrespective of m's strategy.
2) Second, suppose that another miner than m solves his block before the others and before z m . In that case, which block m was mining does not affect his expected gain.
3) Third suppose m solves his block before the others and before z m . In that case, if m was mining B n+1 then an upper bound for his expected gains is
corresponds to the maximum reward expected by m for solving blocks between B n−f +1 and B n+1 . Indeed, m expects the other miners to follow the equilibrium strategy, which is to work on the chain stemming fromB n−f , even if m solves B n+1 first.
If, on the other hand, m was following the equilibrium and miningB n−f +1 , then his equilibrium payoff is
where G(0) is the reward from having mined blocks between B n−f +1 and B n , which become orphaned, and G(M ) is the reward from having minedB n−f +1 which becomes the consensus.
Hence m's expected gains are larger if he follows the equilibrium strategy iff
which holds since G(1) = G(0) = 0.
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II) Now turn to the case in which there is no sunspot after B n is solved. In this case, equilibrium prescribes that m mines B n+1 .
Suppose that, instead of mining B n+1 , m mines another block,B. Again, consider three cases:
The first case is when the next event is z m . In that case, under the first two assumptions in Footnote 11 which block m was mining is irrelevant, while under the third assumption m earns less if he minesB than if he mines B n+1 .
The second case is when the next block is solved by another miner than m. Then, again, which block m was mining is irrelevant.
The third case is when the next event is that m solves his block. Suppose that, at this point, there is no sunspot: If m was mining B n+1 , then this block becomes the consensus, and potentially obtains reward G(M ) (if that block is not orphaned by a subsequent fork.) More precisely, m's expected gain is
16 Clearly, the condition would also hold even if G(1) was not zero, as long as it is small relative to G(M ).
where B S is the block after which there is a sunspot. In contrast, if m was miningB, then, since the others continue to follow the LCR,B does not become the consensus and m only receives reward G(0) on it. Thus, an upper bound on his expected gain is
(9) (8) is larger than (9) the latter, since N m (t B n+1 ) in (8) is equal to N m (t Bn )+1 in (9). Now turn to the case in which there is a sunspot. Then, if m was mining B n+1 , at equilibrium that block becomes orphaned and m is not rewarded for it. Thus, his equilibrium expected gain is
If m was mining any other blockB, that block also becomes orphaned, and an upper bound on m's expected gain is
(10) is (at least weakly) larger than (11) since N m (t B n+1−f ) ≥ N m (t B n−f ).
QED Proof of Proposition 4:
A) Consider at time t ≥ tB n−f +1
, after the fork has started, the miner m with vested interest v old (m, t) and v new (m, t). Under what condition will miners choose to continue along the two branches of the fork? 1) First, we analyse the condition under which m > K prefers to mine the old chain.
To do so consider a strategy prescribing, in particular, to mine the new chain between t and t + dt, and after that any arbitrary course of action. Denote that candidate strategy bys. Next consider an alternative strategy, s prescribing to mine the old chain between t and t + dt and after that the same actions ass. That is s specifies the same mapping from histories to actions ass, except that history is modified for the period [t, t + dt] to do as if m had been mining the new chain.
Under what condition iss dominated by s?
The crucial point is that, by construction, the expected gains ofs and s (to be earned at z m > t + dt) are the same for all blocks mined before t and after t + dt. The comparison betweens and s therefore boils down to the comparison of their payoffs between t and t + dt, reflecting that z m can occur or m solve a block betwen t and t + dt.
For the period [t, t + dt], an upper bound for the expected gain froms is
The first term is the maximum gain from any block mined on the new chain by m during the period (m anticipates that K other miners will stick to the new chain, so that any block he mines in this chain will be worth at most G(K + 1)), while the second term is the value of blocks mined by m before t if z m occurs in [t, t + dt] (when m and K other miners are mining the new chain).
Similarly, for the period [t, t + dt], a lower bound for the expected gain from s is
The first term is the minimum gain from any block mined on the old chain by m during the period (m anticipates that at least M − K − 1 other miners will stick to the old chain, so that any block he mines in this chain will be worth at least G(M − K − 1)), while the second term is the value of blocks mined by m before t if (12) 2) Second, we analyse the condition under which m ≤ K prefers to mine the new chain.
To do so, as above, we consider two strategies:s prescribes to mine the old chain in [t, t + dt]) and after that any arbitrary course of action; s prescribes to mine the old chain between t and t + dt and after that the same actions ass.
Again, by construction, the expected gains ofs and s (to be earned at z m > t+dt) are the same for all blocks mined before t and after t+dt and the comparison betweens and s boils down to the comparison of their payoffs between t and t + dt. (13) B) Now consider how the fork is initiated at time t Bn when the sunspot occurs:
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At the starting point of the fork, v new (m, t Bn ) = 0 for all miners. Hence, the condition under which mining the new chain is dominated, (12), writes as θ m λ m
Miners for whom this condition holds find it optimal to mine the old chain during the period [t Bn , t Bn +dt]. Then, by induction, at all t > t Bn , v new (m, t) = 0 and v old (m, t) ≥ v old (m, t Bn ), condition (12) continues to hold and miners to mine the old chain.
On the other hand, at t Bn (13) writes as
Miners for whom this condition holds find it optimal to mine the new chain during the period [t Bn , t Bn +dt]. Then, by induction, at all t > t Bn , v new (m, t) ≥ 0 and v old (m, t) = v old (m, t Bn ), condition (13) continues to hold and miners to mine the new chain.
Condition (1) ensures that the left-hand-side of (14) is strictly larger than the right-hand-side of (15) so that the two conditions cannot hold at the same time for the same miner. Thus, they define a threshold K ∈ {0, 1, ..M } such that for miners m > K (12) holds, so that m mines the old chain, while for miners m ≤ K (13) holds, so that m mines the new chain. Condition (1) is verified for a large class of functions, including strictly convex and linear functions.
C) Finally, along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 3, one can show that, as long as the sunspot does not occur, miners prefer to stick to the LCR. QED
